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The enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA)1 was an incomplete victory and will remain so even if the 
new Republican congressional majority does not curtail its provisions.  
The legislation has many shortcomings and compromises.  Most im-
portantly, it could have brought help sooner to millions of uninsured 
or under-insured Americans. 
Despite these compromises, public health researchers and practi-
tioners have reason to celebrate.2  Simply put, PPACA fundamentally 
altered and improved the public health infrastructure of the United 
States.  Fully implemented, PPACA promises to markedly improve 
clinical preventive services and transform our nation’s response to 
traditional centerpiece public health concerns, including HIV/AIDS, 
substance abuse, mental health disorders, and other conditions. 
 
† Helen Ross Professor of Social Service Administration and faculty chair of the 
Center for Health Administration Studies, University of Chicago. 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
2 See Harold A. Pollack, Prevention and Public Health, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
LAW (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author) (describing im-
provements that PPACA makes to the U.S. public health system). 
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In this Article, I note several ways in which provisions of PPACA 
promise to improve population health.3  But this Article is less san-
guine regarding the politics of public health.  I submitted the first draft 
in early January 2011, the very week PPACA’s opponents assumed the 
majority in the House of Representatives.4  The Speaker of the House 
has vowed to repeal PPACA,5 and twenty-six states support constitu-
tional challenges to the individual mandate, a central pillar of the new 
law.6  PPACA’s ultimate success depends on the executive branch’s 
ability to implement successfully one of the most complex policy re-
forms in American history against a backdrop of fiscal constraint and 
partisan acrimony.7 
As a sometime participant and advocate in this process,8 I am 
struck in hindsight that the bill’s fervent defenders did not focus more 
explicitly or effectively on these political matters in crafting the final 
bill.  Many commentators noted that key provisions of PPACA would 
likely become politically impregnable once they became part of the 
fabric of American life.9  On many of these provisions, PPACA propo-
nents had less success in structuring the Act to ensure that these pro-
visions would achieve such an embedded status.10 
 
3 I do not address some other ways PPACA improves public health infrastructure, 
such as investments in the medical workforce and Federally Qualified Health Centers.  
For a discussion of these issues, see Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Restoring Health to Health 
Reform:  Integrating Medicine and Public Health to Advance the Population’s Well-Being, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 1777 (2011). 
4 See Carl Hulse, Taking Control, G.O.P. Overhauls Rules in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2011, at A1 (“Jubilant Republicans took control of the House on [January 5, 2011] and 
installed Representative John A. Boehner of Ohio as the new speaker . . . .”). 
5 Id. 
6 See Kevin Sack, Second Judge Deals Blow to Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2011, at A1 (noting that twenty-six states joined a suit challenging PPACA, six of which 
joined after the Republican party took control of those states’ governments).  
7 See Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The War Isn’t Over, 362 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1259, 1260-61 (2010) (detailing anticipated difficulties in implementing PPACA, 
such as information exchanges between state and federal agencies). 
8 See, e.g., Harold A. Pollack, The Ride of a Lifetime, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2010, 
4:53 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-treatment/the-ride-lifetime (commenting on 
my experience working for health reform). 
9 See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, You Thought Passing Health Reform Was Hard?  Try Repealing 
It, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 2, 2010, 11:46 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/ 
79584/repeal-health-reform-difficult-1099 (describing the immense difficulty of repeal-
ing provisions of the statute).  
10 See Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 7, at 1259 (“Given the intensity of Repub-
licans’ opposition to the substance and manner of passage of this reform, if the GOP 
regains the presidency and control of Congress in 2012, implementation could be 
substantially delayed or the law could be . . . repealed before its major elements have 
been implemented.”). 
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Perceptive PPACA supporters certainly understood from the start 
that back-loading implementation was a fundamental political prob-
lem.11  Executive branch and congressional advocates, along with out-
side activists, worked hard to win passage of the best possible bill con-
sistent with political constraints.  However, supporters appear to have 
been less effective in considering how PPACA might be optimally 
structured to withstand likely attack should its critics win an embol-
dening majority.  As a result, the reformers missed opportunities to 
enact and defend effective public health policies. 
I.  PUBLIC HEALTH GAINS IN HEALTH REFORM12 
The contributions of PPACA to population health are easily over-
looked.  PPACA, like most health policy legislation, was not primarily 
designed to address public health services or public health concerns.13  
In this, the bill reflected the unbalanced political economy of Ameri-
can health care, which devotes a disproportionate share of public and 
private resources and political attention to personal medical services 
and tertiary care.14  Although elected officials across the ideological 
spectrum cite the importance of public health,15 public health invest-
ments often fare poorly in legislative bargaining over scarce resources. 
Moreover, many analysts who recognize the centrality of social 
determinants of health argue that expanded access to medical servic-
es is likely to have minimal impact on population health.  Distin-
guished health economists Dana Goldman and Darius Lakdawalla ar-
gue with particular force that PPACA may be overpromising health 
improvement: 
 
11 Paul Starr, The Next Health-Reform Campaign, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 2010, at A3, 
A5-A6 (outlining PPACA’s vulnerability to political obstacles to implementation). 
12 This Part is an expanded and modified version of my article on the improve-
ments to U.S. public health resulting from PPACA.  See Pollack, supra note 2. 
13 See Gostin et al., supra note 3, at 1766-1767 (arguing that PPACA is not focused 
on public health, and providing suggestions for how it could achieve greater public 
health at a lower cost).  
14 See Paula M. Lantz et al., Health Policy Approaches to Population Health:  The Limits 
of Medicalization, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1253, 1256 (2007) (noting that health policy usually 
focuses on expanding access to personal medical services to the exclusion of exp-
anding access to other services that affect an individual’s health). 
15 For example, Senator John McCain’s 2008 campaign platform supported creating 
public health infrastructure, such as smoking-cessation programs.  See Straight Talk on 
Health System Reform, JOHN MCCAIN 2008 (Oct. 17, 2007), http://replay.web.archive.org/ 
20081219070603/http://www.johnmccain.com/content/default.aspx?guid=8475c713-a5
41-4b97-a2aa-800e35da37bb (accessed by entering the McCain campaign’s website ad-
dress in the Internet Archive index). 
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 Advocates of universal coverage often get confused on this point.  
They equate good health with having health insurance, and cite myriad 
academic studies.  The problem is that these studies don’t account for all 
the other differences between the insured and uninsured—what they 
eat, where they live, whether they smoke or drink, the amount of stress 
in their lives, and even their genetic predisposition to disease.  No 
healthcare system is good enough to fully compensate for bad behavior 
and poor environmental factors. 
 Perhaps the strongest and earliest such evidence came from the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), which randomly assigned 
families to health insurance plans of varying generosity.  One of the 
main findings of this experiment was that families in the least generous 
plan (95 percent coinsurance) spent nearly 30 percent less on medical 
care—with little or no difference in their health.16 
These authors do not identify specific advocates who equate good 
health with having health insurance, or who deny the importance of 
behavioral or environmental risk factors.  As a result, it is unclear how 
many advocates of universal coverage are actually confused or naïve 
on these basic points. 
Still, the authors’ point is well-taken.  Health insurance coverage 
does not address many threats to individual and population health.  
Balanced policies must attend to social determinants of health—
education, housing, accidents and violence, public safety, workplace 
safety, environmental protection—as well as to reducing barriers to 
personal medical services.  Social policy is health policy in each of 
these areas.17 
Health policy researchers are increasingly aware of the dangers in 
overstating the link between insurance and health.  At the same time, it 
is tempting to misapply social epidemiology to wrongly dismiss the im-
portance of expanded health coverage.  There is substantial evidence, 
much of it compiled in the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), 
that expanded access to care improves health outcomes, particularly in 
patients with cardiovascular risk-factors and hypertension.18 
 
16 Dana P. Goldman & Darius N. Lakdawalla, Can the ACA Improve Population 
Health?, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, no. 5, art. 4, 2010, at 1, 1-2, http://www.bepress.com/ev/ 
vol7/iss5/art4. 
17 See ROBERT F. SCHOENI ET AL., MAKING AMERICANS HEALTHIER:  SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY AS HEALTH POLICY 3-23 (2008) (considering the general health 
effects of social economic policy); Lantz, supra note 14, at 1254 (describing the need to 
incorporate social policy into health policy considerations).  
18 See, e.g., Emmett B. Keeler et al., How Free Care Reduced Hypertension in the Health 
Insurance Experiment, 254 JAMA 1926, 1926 (1985) (finding that hypertensives with free 
care had more visits with their physicians, which led to higher rates of diagnoses). 
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The experiment was too short to directly investigate mortality dif-
ferences across the different treatment plans.19  However, study investi-
gators were able to explore statistical models of human mortality attri-
butable to basic measurable risk factors.20  Within these analyses, 
low-income HIE participants enrolled in high-deductible plans dis-
played notably higher predicted mortality than did their otherwise 
comparable peers enrolled in a free care plan.21 
Almost all of the predicted mortality reduction reflected improved 
hypertension detection and treatment.22  Subsequent studies support 
these findings.23  Goldman and Lakdawalla themselves note that “poor 
people with high blood pressure had slightly higher [predicted] 
mortality rates” when assigned to high-deductible rather than free 
health care plans.24 
As these studies demonstrate, health insurance coverage facilitates 
the receipt of basic health services, which in turn enables primary care 
providers or others to detect hypertension and to provide accompany-
ing treatment through inexpensive medications.  Access to such care 
rarely produces large changes in health behavior or in social determi-
nants of health,25 but it does give individuals access to basic, effective 
treatments that improve health and prolong life. 
Using nationally representative longitudinal data from the Health 
and Retirement Study, J. Michael McWilliams and colleagues found 
substantially higher eight-year mortality rates among uninsured indi-
viduals ages fifty-five to sixty-four than among facially similar insured 
peers.26  Mortality differences were especially stark within the lowest 
 
19
 JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS 
FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 204 (1993). 
20 Id. at 210-11. 
21 Id. at 211 tbl.6.13. 
22 See Robert H. Brook et al., Does Free Care Improve Adults’ Health?  Results from a 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426, 1429-33 (1983) (finding that 
free care benefits those with “specific conditions,” such as hypertension, and is likely to 
lower their mortality risk). 
23 See, e.g., Joseph D. Freeman et al., The Causal Effect of Health Insurance on Utiliza-
tion and Outcomes in Adults:  A Systematic Review of U.S. Studies, 46 MED. CARE 1023, 1030 
(2008) (summarizing studies indicating that insurance is associated with decreased 
mortality rates). 
24 Goldman & Lakdawalla, supra note 16, at 2. 
25 See E.B. Keeler et al., Effects of Cost Sharing on Physiological Health, Health Practices, 
and Worry, 6 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 279, 302-03 (1987) (finding that increased access 
to free care does little to create better health habits). 
26 J. Michael McWilliams et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Mortality Among the 
Near-Elderly, 23 HEALTH AFF. 223, 228 exhibit 2 (2004) (reporting a three to five 
percent difference in mortality rates). 
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quartile of household income as well as among adults with diabetes, 
hypertension, or heart disease.27  Mortality hazard rates among the un-
insured were more than fifty percent higher than those observed 
among the insured in both the low-income and the cardiovascu-
lar-illness groups.28 
Given the non-experimental nature of these analyses, it is possible 
that unobserved factors account for the observed mortality differenc-
es.  Yet the authors conducted sensitivity analyses which suggest that 
complete confounding is unlikely: 
[A]n unobserved factor similar to smoking in prevalence (approximately 
25 percent of the study cohort) and its association with insurance status 
(relative risk of being uninsured equal to 1.66) would have to be asso-
ciated with a relative eight-year mortality risk of 2.65 for the association 
between insurance status and mortality to become non-significant when 
further adjusted for this unobserved factor.  In comparison, smoking was 
associated with a relative eight-year mortality risk of 2.48.
29
 
Medicare studies provide further support for the causal impor-
tance of health coverage.  In a series of other studies, the same re-
searchers documented improvement in many health measures when 
individuals reached the age of Medicare eligibility, along with surpri-
singly large reductions in racial, ethnic and educational disparities.30  
Racial disparities in systolic blood pressure decreased by approximate-
ly sixty percent.31  Educational, racial, and ethnic disparities in blood 
glucose control decreased by more than seventy-five percent.32  Educa-
tional disparities in total cholesterol levels became negligible.33  Re-
ceipt of key preventive services, such as mammography and prostate 
 
27 See id. at 229 exhibit 4 (demonstrating a difference of approximately six percent 
between insured and uninsured individuals). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 228-29. 
30 See, e.g., J. Michael McWilliams, Health Consequences of Uninsurance among Adults 
in the United States:  Recent Evidence and Implications, 87 MILBANK Q. 443, 470 (2009); J. 
Michael McWilliams et al., Health of Previously Uninsured Adults After Acquiring Medicare 
Coverage, 298 JAMA 2886, 2892 (2007); J. Michael McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare 
Coverage on Basic Clinical Services for Previously Uninsured Adults, 290 JAMA 757, 761 
(2003) [hereinafter McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare Coverage]; J. Michael McWil-
liams et al., Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured Medicare Beneficiaries, 357 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 143, 149-50 (2007). 
31 J. Michael McWilliams et al., Differences in Control of Cardiovascular Disease and Di-
abetes by Race, Ethnicity, and Education:  U.S. Trends from 1999 to 2006 and Effects of Medi-
care Coverage, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 505, 512 fig.3 (2009). 
32 Id. at 511 fig.2. 
33 Id. at 512 fig.3. 
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cancer screening, also sharply increased at age sixty-five among the 
previously uninsured.34 
Expanded Medicaid eligibility is an especially important institu-
tional shift.35  Although expanded Medicaid is usually discussed as a 
vehicle to reduce the number of uninsured, it has particular implica-
tions for the patchwork of providers and services in safety-net care. 
Medicaid is currently a means-tested categorical program which 
only covers certain types of low-income individuals—for example, 
children under the federal poverty level, or those who are eligible for 
specific programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI).36  Many poor work-
ing parents or single adults are not eligible for Medicaid.37  In particu-
lar, unattached adults who are drug-dependent or HIV-infected are 
often ineligible.38  These individuals, therefore, rely on a patchwork 
of safety-net providers to finance substance-abuse treatment and oth-
er essential services.39 
By 2014, PPACA will extend Medicaid eligibility to every American 
with a household income below 133% of the poverty line.40  These  
individuals will gain access to the full apparatus of Medicaid-funded 
services for their primary conditions, while their providers will gain 
access to more generous and secure funding.  They will also have Med-
icaid coverage to treat the physical and psychiatric co-morbidities that 
now often go unaddressed. 
This change will require significant adjustments within both the 
public and private sectors.  Existing federal programs such as the Ryan 
White CARE Act and the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
 
34 McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare Coverage, supra note 30, at 761 tbl.2. 
35 See ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK:  WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY 
CHANGES ARE ENACTED 163-67 (2008) (discussing institutional change as a mechanism 
for sustained policy reform). 
36 See INST. OF MED., PUBLIC FINANCING AND DELIVERY OF HIV/AIDS CARE:  SECUR-
ING THE LEGACY OF RYAN WHITE 109-17 (2001) (describing barriers to eligibility and 
the special programs that provide coverage). 
37 Id. at 109.  
38 See id. (noting that many needy, working individuals earn incomes above the 
Medicaid eligibility level). 
39 Id.  
40 KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., OPTI-
MIZING MEDICAID ENROLLMENT:  PERSPECTIVES ON STRENGTHENING MEDICAID’S REACH 
UNDER HEALTH CARE REFORM 3 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/ 
upload/8068.pdf.  
POLLACK REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:39 PM 
2068 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 2061 
Block Grant must be redesigned for an era of near-universal coverage.41  
Moreover, traditional providers such as methadone clinics will face new 
competition from Federally Qualified Health Centers and accountable-
care organizations, which have new incentives and resources to expand 
their reach into mental and behavioral health services.42 
PPACA also enhances the financing of clinical preventive services 
by requiring insurers to reimburse evidence-based preventive services 
without patient cost-sharing.  In particular, insurers will be required 
to cover services that either have received an “A” or “B” rating from 
the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), or that 
are supported by other selected public health guidelines released by 
federal agencies.43 
The USPSTF attracted controversy when it declined to endorse 
routine mammography screening for women in their forties, leading 
many citizens and advocacy groups to argue that these provisions of 
PPACA will be used to ration care.44  The more important change is to 
ensure that evidence-informed services are fully covered for popula-
tions in which there is documented need.45  Many of these services fo-
cus on politically marginalized or obscure populations that have im-
portant yet unmet needs. 
Finally, PPACA establishes a Prevention and Public Health Fund 
to support preventive services and public health infrastructure.46  The 
 
41 See, e.g., Harold Pollack, Progress on HIV, but Will It Last?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 16, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/76312/progress-hiv-will-it-last 
(noting that PPACA will have an enormous impact on long-standing federal programs, 
many of which will need to be modified as a result). 
42 See Harold Pollack, Rehab:  America’s Drug Policies Just Got a Whole Lot Better, NEW 
REPUBLIC (May 14, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/rehab (dis-
cussing federally funded addiction-treatment services affected by PPACA). 
43 PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West Supp. 1A 2010); see also 
Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform:  Preventive Services, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 15, 2010, 
11:48 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/07/15/implementing-health-reform- 
preventive-services (summarizing some of the requirements of section 1001). 
44 See Eric M. Patashnik & Alan S. Gerber, Problem Solving in a Polarized Age:  Com-
parative Effectiveness Research and the Politicization of Evidence-Based Medicine, THE FORUM 
no. 1, art. 3, 2010, at 7, 7, n.1, http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol8/iss1/art3 (“The 
Obama Administration responded to the public outcry . . . by promising that 
government insurance programs would continue to cover mammograms for women 
starting at age 40.”). 
45 See U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Recommendations, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http:// 
www.healthcare.gov/center/regulations/prevention/taskforce.html (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011) (listing various types of preventive actions and the populations that would 
benefit the most from them). 
46 PPACA § 4002, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300u-11; see also Public Health Provisions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, PUB. HEALTH L. NETWORK, http:// 
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Fund will allocate approximately $15 billion over the next decade.47  
Funded activities include diabetes, HIV, and violence prevention; in-
frastructure development of epidemiological surveillance systems; 
and case-finding for sexually-transmitted infections, tobacco control, 
obesity and more.48 
In some areas, such as smoking cessation, a wide range of evidence-
based programs are available.49  In others, such as obesity prevention, 
the field is at an earlier, more tentative point.50 
II.  THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE 
Each of the above public health provisions promises to be an im-
portant substantive accomplishment.  Each is also potentially threat-
ened by the changed legislative landscape, by political vulnerabilities 
created by the design of the new law, and by the state and local fiscal 
crisis.  PPACA was carefully crafted, from a political perspective, to win 
legislative enactment.51  Its backers also carefully crafted its provisions 
to maximize the chances that it would eventually become part of the 
fabric of American political life.52 
The fact that PPACA was passed at all represented a historic ac-
complishment—one that testifies to the determination and political 
skills of its backers.  Yet its backers now face a more immediate chal-
lenge:  implementing, preserving, and defending a relatively unpopu-
lar bill in the face of a hostile congressional majority. 
 
www.publichealthlawnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/ACA-chart-formatted-FINAL2.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (noting that PPACA section 4001 establishes the Prevention 
and Public Health Fund). 
47 PUB. HEALTH L. NETWORK, supra note 46. 
48 See Georges Benjamin & Larry Cohen, The Prevention and Public Health Fund:  
Good for Our Health, Good for Small Business, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sep. 13, 2010), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2010/September/091310benjamincohen.
aspx (describing the benefits likely to result from the Fund’s screening programs). 
49 See Michael C. Fiore, A Clinical Practice Guideline for Treating Tobacco Use and De-
pendence:  A US Public Health Service Report, 283 JAMA 3244, 3244 (2000) (providing an 
“evidence-based, updated guideline” with “specific recommendations regarding brief 
and intensive tobacco cessation interventions”). 
50 See John Cawley, The Cost-Effectiveness of Programs to Prevent or Reduce Obesity:  The 
State of the Literature and a Future Research Agenda, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLES-
CENT MED. 611, 612 (2007) (“[T]he research literature [regarding obesity] is still at 
the earlier stage of determining whether specific interventions work at all.”). 
51 Mark A. Peterson, It Was a Different Time:  Obama and the Unique Opportunity for 
Health Care Reform, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 429, 435-36 (forthcoming June 2011) 
(describing the strategic choices leading led to PPACA’s successful passage). 
52 See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 9 (noting that PPACA’s provisions are difficult to re-
peal because of the financial costs involved).  
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Had they foreseen the outcome of the 2010 election, PPACA sup-
porters might have fashioned this legislation rather differently.  Of 
course, hindsight offers greater clarity than can be expected in the 
moment.  But some political challenges and strategic missteps could 
have been readily anticipated based on the history of other reforms. 
Eric Patashnik’s Reforms at Risk provides an especially valuable 
framework to explore these questions.53  Patashnik examines the polit-
ical feasibility of “general-interest reforms” that provide broad-
reaching social value but which may not advance the interests of spe-
cific constituencies.54  Some general-interest reforms, such as airline 
deregulation, endure.55  Others, such as the 1986 tax reform, were 
passed with great fanfare but then gradually unraveled.56 
Patashnik anticipated one fundamental political concern facing 
supporters of health reform:  its back-loaded implementation.  As Pa-
tashnik argues, “It takes time for reforms to embed themselves in go-
verning routines, but time is a luxury reform advocates may not 
have.”57  Moreover, Patashnik adds, “Reforms endure not because they 
are ‘frozen in place’ . . . . Rather, they endure because they reconfi-
gure the political dynamic.”58 
As previously noted, the fact that key provisions will not be opera-
tional until 2014 or later is the greatest and most obvious shortcom-
ing of the health reform.  Its key features may eventually reconfigure 
the political dynamic surrounding health insurance and health poli-
cy.  Yet many of the most important political and policy outcomes will 
be determined before this occurs.  PPACA was enacted in March 2010, 
and the 2010 and 2012 elections—and in some cases the 2014 or lat-
er elections—will occur before its most costly and important ele-
ments take force.59 
In the meantime, states and localities are experiencing profound 
fiscal retrenchment, with an accompanying retrenchment of public 
 
53 PATASHNIK, supra note 35. 
54 Id. at 155. 
55 See id. at 133 (contending that airline deregulation has been a long-lasting 
policy because important private parties adapted to the reform instead of trying to 
drive reform). 
56 See id. at 54 (noting that, from the beginning, commentators “warned that reform 
might not stick” because the act did not force any actors to change their behavior). 
57 Id. at 155. 
58 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
59 See Henry J. Aaron, The Midterm Elections—--High Stakes for Health Policy, 363 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1685, 1687 (2010) (“Since most major provisions of the [PP]ACA do not 
take effect until January 1, 2014, delaying tactics might eventually enable repeal.”). 
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health efforts.60  Thousands of public health workers have been laid off 
over the past two years and many health departments have reduced 
services, despite growing needs for those services.61  Retrenchment may 
worsen as states and localities experience continued fiscal difficulties.  
PPACA does little to address these losses directly.  Moreover, proper 
implementation of PPACA depends at many points upon state lawmak-
ers’ skills, resources, and desire to cooperate with federal authorities. 
It is unclear whether these state budget challenges politically help 
or hinder PPACA’s implementation.  Governors fear that it will im-
pose additional costs through Medicaid and other programs.62  How-
ever, PPACA also makes available additional resources for Federally 
Qualified Health Centers, workforce training, and other activities of 
great value to cash-strapped states.63 
PPACA is also vulnerable because key provisions rely upon the ap-
propriation decisions of future Congresses.64  The Prevention and 
Public Health Fund may be the single most vulnerable item: 
One aide said health reform’s preventive health spending is one of the 
“top three” offsets in the law that congressional Republican staffers are 
eyeing, with the idea that a few moderate Democrats facing tough races 
in 2012 could eventually be brought on board. . . . Republicans have 
long derided the multibillion Prevention and Public Health Fund as 
wasteful spending, scoffing at its investment in bike paths and farmers’ 
markets.  One Republican Senate aide quipped that it was a “slush fund 
for jungle gyms.”65 
 
60 See, e.g., Julie Appleby, Groups Vie for a Piece of Health Law’s $15 Billion Prevention 
Fund, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 7, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/ 
2010/May/08/prevention-money-fight-health-reform-law.aspx (“Eighty-five percent of 
health departments surveyed by association[s] of health officials say they have reduced 
services since July 2008, often because of state budget shortfalls.”). 
61 See LHD Budget Cuts and Job Losses, NACCHO, http://www.naccho.org/topics/ 
infrastructure/lhdbudget/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (reporting that 
roughly 29,000 local health jobs were lost from January 2008 to December 2010). 
62 See Harold Pollack, Forget About Boehner.  Try Republican Governors, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Oct. 29, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/78760/health- 
care-obama-congress-republican-governors (noting that some governors have ex-
pressed concerns about how to finance PPACA’s mandated programs and arguing that 
those governors may provide valuable political support for the Act in return for finan-
cial aid for those programs). 
63 See id. (noting that PPACA “expands funding for community health cen-
ters. . . . [that] also provide thousands of jobs.”). 
64 See generally PATASHNIK, supra note 35, at 155 (arguing that reforms often fail be-
cause future governmental actors lack the same vision as those who enacted the reform). 
65 Sarah Kliff, Doc Fix New Weapon vs. Health Reform, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2010, 5:09 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/45976.html. 
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Republicans have proposed to zero out the Prevention and Public 
Health Fund in two legislative battles:  the first is a proposed 
amendment by Nebraska Republican Senator Mike Johanns to re-
peal a small-business tax reporting requirement,66 and the second is 
a proposed measure to finance one year of Medicare’s proposed 
“doctor fix.”67 
At first glance, the fund’s political predicament is rooted in ideo-
logical disagreement about the value of preventive services, fraught 
with problematic symbolism evocative of such past efforts as “midnight 
basketball” for urban youth.68  Some fund activities concern HIV pre-
vention and reproductive health services that have traditionally  
attracted congressional concern.69 
Yet the Fund’s fundamental difficulty is that it rests on a simple ap-
propriation, which can be readily eliminated or cut by congressional 
majorities that oppose specific program activities or that simply wish to 
reallocate $15 billion to other purposes in a constrained fiscal environ-
ment.  Although the Fund provides money for valued services, it was not 
structured to maximize its likelihood of survival in unfavorable political 
conditions.  These portions of PPACA did not create institutional 
changes or legal obligations that would raise the costs of future budget 
cuts.  Individuals receiving Fund-financed services have no specific legal 
right to continued benefits.  States that administer Fund-financed pro-
grams have no similar continued legal claim to federal monies. 
Ironically, the Fund might have stronger political prospects if it 
were a “slush fund” for specific constituencies.  Unlike programs to 
promote agricultural subsidies, specific weapons systems, small busi-
ness owners, home mortgages, health coverage, or higher education, 
the Fund is not structured to serve or cultivate concentrated consti-
tuencies who could then lobby for continued appropriations. 
 
66 See Harold Pollack, For THIS Congress Might Defund Public Health?, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Sept. 12, 2010, 8:31 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/77604/republicans- 
tax-evasion (describing Senator Johanns’s proposal to eliminate the Prevention and 
Public Health Fund in order to fund a tax measure). 
67 See Kliff, supra note 65 (discussing Republicans’ use of the Medicare “doc fix” 
to take funding from health reform). 
68 Darren Wheelock & Doug Hartmann, Midnight Basketball and the 1994 Crime Bill 
Debates:  The Operation of a Racial Code, 48 SOC. Q. 315, 316 (2007) (describing interest-
group agitation that led to the evisceration of the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994). 
69 See Nancy Folbre, Sex and the Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Feb. 5, 2009, 
4:16 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/sex-and-the-stimulus (de-
scribing opposition from many quarters to a family planning funding element in a 
stimulus package). 
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Almost by definition, the Fund serves critical, frequently disorga-
nized, and politically marginal constituencies.  Consumers of smoking-
cessation quit lines, or individuals requiring treatment and screening 
for sexually transmitted infection or substance abuse, for example, are 
poorly positioned to advocate for their programs.  But the Fund does 
have a strong ideological constituency within the public health com-
munity.  Given the perceived alignment between the public health 
community and politically liberal causes,70 such advocacy may be more 
effective when Democrats rather than Republicans are politically asc-
endant in Congress. 
Other PPACA provisions face political risks due to poor program 
design.  As noted above, Nebraska Senator Mike Johanns sought un-
successfully to defund the Prevention and Public Health Fund to 
finance repeal of a tax compliance measure included in PPACA.71  
That PPACA provision required small businesses to file 1099 income 
tax forms for a range of additional transactions exceeding $600.72  In 
the aftermath of PPACA’s passage, lawmakers received intense lobby-
ing from representatives of small businesses who found this provision 
to impose unreasonable burdens.73 
Republicans sought to eliminate this provision entirely, while 
Democrats sought to exempt purchases of less than $5000 (and firms 
employing less than twenty-five people) from the new requirement.74  
Although Democrats assembled fifty-six Senate votes for their pre-
ferred modification, they could not assemble a cloture-proof majority.75 
Thus, the original unpopular tax provision remains settled law, 
leading to great anger within the key constituency of small-business 
owners directed towards PPACA.  The vast unpopularity of this meas-
ure provides critics with little political incentive to help the Obama 
administration or congressional Democrats correct its technical de-
 
70 See SALLY SATEL, PC, M.D.:  HOW POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IS CORRUPTING MED-
ICINE 17 (2001) (arguing that public health has moved away from finding scientific 
means for disease prevention towards social justice advocacy). 
71 See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Ezra Klein, Senate Fails 
Small-Business Owners on 1099 Reform, WASH. POST BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010, 1:26 PM), http:// 
voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/09/the_senate_fails_small_business.html 
(noting the failure of Senator Johanns’s proposal). 
72 Id. 
73 See, e.g., Bob Graboyes, 1099 Collation Calamity, NFIB HEALTHCARE BULL. (Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus., Nashville, Tenn), Aug. 10, 2010, at 11 (arguing forcefully that 
PPACA would “drown[] small business under an ocean of IRS Form 1099s”). 
74 Klein, supra note 71 (describing the Senate’s failed attempt to amend PPACA). 
75 Id. 
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fects.  Indeed the National Federation of Independent Business and 
others have made “the 1099 Collation Calamity” a centerpiece of an 
effective anti-PPACA political campaign.76  The Wall Street Journal edito-
rialized in favor of NFIB’s position, making no mention of Democrats’ 
attempted, but filibustered, fix.77 
The newly established Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan 
(PCIP)78 provides a second example of a problematic program design 
causing broader difficulties.  This program allocates $5 billion be-
tween 2010 and 2014 to provide health insurance coverage for indi-
viduals with pre-existing conditions who lack health insurance cover-
age.79  PCIP appears to suffer from all three difficulties identified in a 
December 2010 analysis by Patashnik and Zelitzer of the political sus-
tainability of policy reforms:  “[w]eak policy design, inadequate or 
conflicting institutional supports, and poor timing.”80   
As I describe in greater detail elsewhere,81 this program faces se-
rious operational and design challenges.  The most serious of these 
challenges is the simple fact that available funding appears adequate 
to serve less than ten percent of Americans who face the dual chal-
lenge of chronic illness and the lack of health insurance coverage.82 
Such design defects place these specific programs at risk and 
create broader political vulnerabilities for the entire bill.  As New York 
Times columnist David Brooks asserted in a January 2011 essay: 
 The health care reform law was signed 10 months ago, and what’s 
striking now is how vulnerable it looks.  Several threats have emerged—
some of them scarcely discussed before passage—that together or alone 
could seriously endanger the new system.  These include:  
. . .  
 
76 Graboyes, supra note 73, at 11. 
77 The 1099 Stonewall, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Sept. 20, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748703904304575498071550034964.html (opining that “Dem-
ocrats slammed the door on a bipartisan attempt to repeal” the 1099 reporting  
requirement). 
78 See, e.g., Harold A. Pollack, High-Risk Pools for the Sick and Uninsured Under Health 
Reform:  Too Little and Thus Too Late, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 91, 91-92 (2011). 
79 Id. 
80 Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, When Policy Does Not Remake Politics:  
The Limits of Policy Feedback 5 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1449996. 
81 See Pollack, supra note 78, at 91 (arguing that “[t]o provide adequate health 
care for uninsured individuals with chronic diseases, the federal PCIP appropriations 
would need to be many times higher . . . .”). 
82 See Patashnik & Zelizer, supra note 80, at 5. 
POLLACK REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:39 PM 
2011] Health Reform and Public Health 2075 
 False projections.  The new system is based on a series of expert projec-
tions on how people will behave.  In the first test case, these projections 
were absurdly off base.  According to the Medicare actuary, 375,000 
people should have already signed up for the new high-risk pools for the 
uninsured, but only 8,000 have. 
 More seriously, cost projections are way off.  For example, New 
Hampshire’s plan has only about 80 members, but the state has already 
burned through nearly double the $650,000 that the federal government 
allotted to help run the program.  If other projections are off by this 
much, the results will be disastrous.
83
 
For technical reasons, the design and forecasting problems with 
PCIP are less severe than Brooks implied.  However, the inherent dif-
ficulty of designing and implementing this complex and temporary 
program poses many political challenges which might have been 
avoided through more carefully crafted provisions in the original bill. 
More complex issues have been raised regarding the Community 
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) disability insurance 
program.  Experts disagree about the actuarial soundness of CLASS’s 
current program design, with the Congressional Budget Office taking 
a more optimistic view84 than the chief actuary of the Center for Medi-
caid and Medicaid Services (CMS).85  Should the most serious con-
cerns be borne out, CLASS’s challenges provide another potential 
area of political vulnerability for health reform. 
III.  SUCCESSFUL MODELS OF POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE  
PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES 
Although some public health measures (enacted within PPACA or 
other legislation) appear politically vulnerable, others appear likely to 
be sustained under both Democratic and Republican majorities. 
Tobacco excise taxes may be the most successful public health 
measure in terms of cultivating powerful supportive constituencies 
 
83 David Brooks, Opinion, Buckle Up for Round 2, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at A19. 
84 See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to George 
Miller, Chairman, House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, at 1 (Nov. 25, 2009), at 1, available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10769/CLASS_Additional_Information_Miller_ 
letter.pdf (“For both the House and Senate versions of CLASS, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) estimates that the cash flows under the new program would generate 
budgetary savings (that is, a reduction in net federal outlays) for the 2010-–2019 period 
and for the 10 years following . . . .”). 
85 See Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Ctr. for Medicare & Me-
dicaid Servs., at 2 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/ 
Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf (finding that the CLASS program will generate net 
losses every year from 2010-–2019, for a total of $37.8 billion). 
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over time.  The Institute of Medicine and other expert bodies have 
identified excise taxes as important tools to reduce smoking.86  These 
policies have proven especially sustainable for the obvious reason that 
they yield valuable revenue at every level of American government.87  
Between 1995 and 2009, federal cigarette excise taxes increased 321%, 
while the average state excise tax increased by 267%.88  These tax in-
creases finance a variety of medical and public health interventions, 
ranging from the Children’s Health Insurance Program to smoking-
cessation quit lines.  These revenues are also used to reduce state and 
local budget deficits or to meet other important social needs.89 
From a public health perspective, it is ideal when such revenues 
finance measures to directly improve population health.  The mere 
fact that all levels of government depend on these revenues for popu-
lar activities helps to sustain these policies politically, even—or espe-
cially—during hard economic times when many public health services 
and expenditures are curbed.90 
Other public health measures have also proved politically effec-
tive.  As noted above, PPACA greatly expanded coverage of preventive 
services that are given high ratings by the USPSTF.91  Viewed through 
the lens of Patashnik’s analysis, this provision’s institutional shift 
makes it especially politically generative.92 
USPSTF, a rather marginalized expert body, now has explicit au-
thority in the design and reimbursement of clinical preventive servic-
 
86 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010:  MIDCOURSE RE-
VIEW (2010), at 27-7, available at http://www.healthypeople.gov/2010/Data/midcourse/ 
(describing the successes of Michigan, New Jersey, and Rhode Island in using excise taxes 
to combat smoking). 
87 See 2009–2010 Proposed State Legislation for Tobacco Tax Increases, NAT’L CONF. ON 
STATE LEGIS.), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13862 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (listing various states’ expected revenues from tobacco taxes and how those rev-
enues will be distributed across various levels of state government). 
88  Federal and State Cigarette Excise Taxes—United States, 1995–2009, 58 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 524, 524 (2009). 
89 NAT’L CONF. ON STATE LEGIS., supra note 87. 
90 Curiously, the same trend has not applied to alcohol taxes.  The real value of 
excise taxes on beer and spirits has markedly declined since the 1950s, despite strong 
evidence that such taxes are below the levels required for drinkers to internalize fully 
the economic costs of alcohol-related harm.  See PHILIP J. COOK, PAYING THE TAB:  THE 
ECONOMICS OF ALCOHOL POLICY 165 (2007) (“[L]ooking back fifty years from 2005, 
the federal excise tax on liquor (adjusted for inflation) was 5.7 times as high, and the 
excise tax on beer 3.6 times as high.”). 
91 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
92 See PATASHNIK, supra note 35, at 155 (discussing how the most enduring reforms 
are politically dynamic). 
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es.93  This immediately fosters improved reimbursement and utiliza-
tion of specific services that are unlikely to be the target of focused po-
litical advocacy, such as chlamydia screening. 
Some services, such as Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral 
to Treatment (SBIRT) for alcohol disorders, have been subject to pro-
longed legislative and regulatory debate.  Because these services have 
earned a “B” rating from USPSTF,94 they will now be reimbursed. 
Other forms of screening yield high marks from USPSTF, yet are of-
ten excluded from public or private insurance coverage if they are 
proposed under the umbrella of population screening rather than as 
clinically indicated diagnostic tests for particular patients. 
Over the long term, this provision may prove important in other 
ways.  USPSTF is acknowledged as a central player in health policy.  
Clinicians, researchers, and funders now have much greater incentives 
to conduct clinical trials of promising services that might receive fa-
vorable USPSTF ratings.  Prevention trials financed by the National 
Institutes of Health, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and others suddenly 
have direct policy relevance if they satisfy USPSTF’s rigorous criteria 
for prevention trials. 
The full implications of this change remain to be seen, but this 
major policy change commands attention.  Although USPSTF deci-
sions are occasionally controversial, Congress is less likely to curb 
USPSTF’s authority to expand access to clinical services than it is to 
approve more expansive coverage of specific popular services that fail 
to pass USPSTF muster, such as mammography for young women who 
have no indicated risk factors.95 
Other regulatory elements of PPACA are also politically genera-
tive.  The language specifying health insurance exchanges provides 
significant protections for individuals with mental health and sub-
stance abuse disorders.  By including these disorders in the language 
governing medical homes, PPACA encourages Federally Qualified 
Health Centers, as well as other kinds of organizations, including the 
Mayo Clinic, to address concerns that have traditionally been viewed 
within the province of safety-net care. 
 
93 PPACA, sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
94 See U.S. Preventive Servs. Task Force, Screening and Behavioral Counseling Interven-
tions in Primary Care to Reduce Alcohol Misuse:  Recommendation Statement, 140 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 554, 554 (2004). 
95 U.S. Preventive Servs. Task Force, Screening for Breast Cancer:  U.S. Preventive Ser-
vices Task Force Recommendation Statement, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 716, 716 (2009). 
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IV.  DESIGNING MORE SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC HEALTH POLICIES 
The legislative and implementation battles that surround PPACA 
challenge public health activists, researchers, and practitioners to con-
struct more durable policies.  Sustainable policies must nurture the 
conditions for future political success.  Such policies are politically 
generative when they attract new political allies and friendly interest 
groups, or when they create lasting institutional shifts that favor con-
tinued public health investment. 
In tangible ways, PPACA might have been designed to be more 
robust in the face of a hostile majority.  PCIP provides an egregious 
example.  Although this program builds on traditional Republican 
proposals and is ideologically moderate, its cumbersome program de-
sign, combined with its low level of funding, makes it unlikely to win 
strong political support.  PCIP’s avowedly temporary structure gives 
potential allies especially little reason to embrace it or to expend polit-
ical capital on its behalf. 
Other strategies were available that provided simpler and more 
politically sustainable models to more quickly help the medically un-
insured.  Early in the health reform process, Senator Max Baucus 
proposed shortening the required Medicare waiting period for indi-
viduals deemed eligible for federal disability programs.96  Several hun-
dred thousand uninsured individuals with disabling conditions now 
endure this waiting period and could be helped through modifying 
the program rules.97 
Expanding Medicare eligibility to this group represented a more 
administratively feasible change that could have quickly mobilized an 
organized constituency within the disability community.  Moreover, 
the government could initiate this program through an expansion of 
the Medicare entitlement that would be difficult for future legislators 
to repeal and that would not require explicit appropriations from a 
future Congress.  Ironically, the key drawback of this policy change is 
financial.  Complete elimination of the Medicare waiting period 
 
96 MAX BAUCUS, CALL TO ACTION:  HEALTH REFORM 2009, at 14 (2008). 
97 Id. at 22; see also STACY BERG DALE & JAMES M. VERDIER, COMMONWEALTH FUND, 
ELIMINATION OF MEDICARE’S WAITING PERIOD FOR SERIOUSLY DISABLED ADULTS:  IMPACT 
ON COVERAGE AND COSTS 1 (2003), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
usr_doc/660_Dale_elimination.pdf (estimating that disabled individuals’ two-year wait-
ing period affected about 1.26 million people as of January 2002). 
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would require much greater federal expenditures than are now being 
provided through PCIP.98 
There are sometimes real tensions between good politics and 
good substantive policy.  The Prevention and Public Health Fund 
might have better political prospects if it had a broader circle of con-
stituencies outside the traditional public health community with a 
vested interest in its survival.  For example, Democratic and Republi-
can governors would have a greater stake in continued appropriations 
if fund resources were explicitly provided through state governments. 
Such shared state-federal ownership brings a real price.  Some 
governors may oppose evidence-based interventions such as a syringe 
exchange.99  Others may demonstrate corresponding enthusiasm for 
popular programs such as abstinence-only education that lack demon-
strated effectiveness.100  Centralized federal control would likely focus 
resources more effectively on evidence-based public health interven-
tions.  When the executive branch and congressional majorities are 
strongly committed to public health, such centralized authority has 
many advantages.  Under less favorable political conditions, however, 
such shared ownership may be more sustainable.  Although some inef-
fective programs are likely to receive funding, overall public health 
funding might be greater and more secure. 
PPACA also could have been structured more imaginatively to 
support state and local public health infrastructure.  For example, lo-
cal health departments can receive Medicaid reimbursement for pre-
natal care, HIV treatment, and other clinical services.101  They cannot 
bill Medicaid for equally important services such as epidemiological 
case-finding or partner-notification services.102  Expanding the scope 
 
98 Compare figures from DALE & VERDIER, supra note 97, at 2, which estimate that 
the change would cost approximately $8.7 billion annually, with those discussed by Pol-
lack, supra note 78, at 91, which note that PPACA provides $5 billion for PCIP funding 
between 2010 and 2014.  
99 See INST. OF MED., NO TIME TO LOSE:  GETTING MORE FROM HIV PREVENTION 
114-16 (Monica S. Ruiz et al. eds., 2001) (discussing political barriers to needle exchange 
programs). 
100 See CHRISTOPHER TRENHOLM ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., 
IMPACTS OF FOUR TITLE V, SECTION 510 ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 59 (2007) 
(finding that abstinence education programs have no impact on rates of sexual  
abstinence). 
101 See Email from Sherry Glied, Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Educ., Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., to author (Oct. 4, 2010) (on file with author) (describing the 
types of preventative services for which PPACA provides funding). 
102 See id. (explaining that these types of services are generally not billable to Me-
dicaid under PPACA). 
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of Medicaid reimbursement to include a greater range of public 
health services would provide valuable financial assistance to state and 
local governments.  It would also allow the federal government to 
more effectively promote and nurture vulnerable services that en-
hance population health. 
The political science literature offers one more sobering lesson in 
formulating politically sustainable policy.  Many within the public 
health community seek to address a central political challenge:  crafting 
persuasive messages to convince voters and policymakers of the value of 
preventive services and measures that improve population health.103  
The good news is that the American public embraces the value of pub-
lic health as a general policy goal.  In a November 2009 survey, seventy-
one percent of registered voters polled indicated that they support in-
creased investments in prevention “to help people stay healthy and 
reduce diseases such as diabetes, cancer and heart disease.”104 
The bad news is that such generalized public support means much 
less than one might hope.  In the first place, public opinion regarding 
public health can markedly shift when the underlying policy issues are 
linked with broader partisan and ideological disputes.105  More fun-
damentally, the history of general-interest reforms suggests that such 
favorable polls are far less important to political outcomes than one 
might suppose.106 
Sustainable public health policy requires more than the passive 
support or the momentary acquiescence of a political majority.  One 
must design policies to nurture the loyalties and investments of specif-
ic interest groups and constituencies who have reason to support and 
defend these new policies.  One must create organizational changes 
that are difficult, costly, or unattractive for future majorities to undo. 
 
103 Robert J. Blendon et al., Americans’ Conflicting Views About the Public Health Sys-
tem, and How to Shore Up Support, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2033, 2038 (2010) (noting that to 
continue to provide support for health care, Americans will want to see examples of 
successful programs). 
104 GREENBERG QUINLA, ROSNER RESEARCH & PUB. OPINION STRATEGIES, AMERI-
CAN PUBLIC SUPPORTS INVESTMENT IN PREVENTION AS PART OF HEALTH CARE REFORM:  
SOLID MAJORITIES FAVOR TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH’S PROPOSALS 2 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.greenbergresearch.com/index.php?ID=2416. 
105 See Sarah E. Gollust et al., The Polarizing Effect of News Media Messages About the 
Social Determinants of Health, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2160, 2165 (2009) (finding that 
Republicans’ and Democrats’ opinions on health care can diverge even when exposed 
to neutral social determinants messages). 
106 See generally PATASHNIK, supra note 35, at 155-71 (noting that popularity at the 
time of enactment has little to do with a reform’s sustainability and discussing the fac-
tors that do impact the long-term survival of reforms). 
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Political durability is no guarantee of policy success.  Yet good pol-
icy that rests on poor political foundations rarely remains good policy 
for very long.  Bolstering these foundations is a critical challenge for 
both public health politics and public health policy. 
 
